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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
VICTOR VIALPANDO, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20020405-CA 
) Priority No. 2. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001), this Court has jurisdiction over 
this case. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44 (2000), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Trooper Plank had reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant after Trooper Plank testified that he had 
observed the defendant chasing a woman? This Court should review the 
trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion for correctness, giving 
1 
limited weight to the trial court's application of the law to the facts: 
"Whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness... [with] a measure of discretion [afforded] to the trial judge 
when applying that standard to a given set of facts." State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994); see also Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 
1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Did the trial court properly admit the intoxilyzer results into evidence after 
finding that Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes prior 
to administering the test? The standard of review for a trial court's factual 
determination is clear error: "A trial court's factual findings will not be 
reversed absent clear error." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60,28 P.3d 
1278, 1291 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). 
Did the trial court properly give a jury instruction containing language 
taken from cases decided by this Court concerning actual physical control 
of a vehicle? The standard of review is correction-of-error: "[W]e review 
the trial court's determination concerning jury instructions for correctness 
and accord it no particular deference." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175, 1176 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, in 
violation of I I C \ § 14 6 : 1 4 for faeit ig ii i acti n il pi i} sical coi ltrol of a v el licle 
while intoxicated on July 2, 2000. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence, alleging that Trooper Plank illegally seized him. Defendant 
also moved to suppress the result (* • ; reath test, arguing t 
I n n eliable Oi i December 1, 20* M >, the ti ial coi irt denied this motion without a 
hearing. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider. On March 12, 2001, Judge 
Walter Ellett heard testimony from the arresting trooper and argument from the 
(ItieiiUaiit Jitttj.ii' 1 l i i l l f 4 II 11 II i liiiii! I n Ilniil , had i iMsoimbk1 s u sp i c ion (n s lop 
the defendant and that the test result was admissible. A jury trial was held on 
April 24, 2002 in front of Judge Pat B. Brian. The jury convicted the defendant of 
driving or being in actual physical control of a \ chicle \ v 1 rile n u idei 1:1 le infh ience of 
alcohol. ' ": 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 2, 2000, Trooper Plank of the Utah Highway Patrol was on patrol 
in the early i iioi ning hoi irs f! 61 ^ i oi it l i 1:00 a i n , * 1 lile ti a\ eling up 3200 
West and approaching the South Frontage Road, from a distance of approximately 
fifty yards, Trooper Plank noticed a woman being chased across the street by a 
m a n I" M I lit* nuiii v\ii,. Lfti'if i t lail iTiod ;is ddci in l , nl \' i lp .nnlo I'! 61 l i m o p e i 
Plank testified that the man and woman were yelling and appeared to be in an 
altercation. R.61. 
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Trooper Plank was alarmed by the situation and wanted to make sure that 
the woman was safe. R.62. Trooper Plank activated his overhead lights to stop 
the defendant from chasing the woman and turned his vehicle around at the first 
opportunity. R. 61. Trooper Plank observed the defendant cross the street again, 
then enter a car. R.62. Trooper Plank pulled his vehicle directly behind the 
defendant. R.62. Trooper Plank approached the defendant and asked why he had 
been chasing the woman. R. 62. The defendant explained that the woman was his 
girlfriend and that they had been fighting. R. 63. Trooper Plank observed that the 
defendant was in the driver's seat (R.68); the vehicle's headlights were on (Trial 
Tr., p.33-34); the keys were in the ignition (Trial Tr., p.33); and the defendant had 
his seatbelt on (Trial Tr., p.33). Upon talking with the defendant, Trooper Plank 
noticed that his eyes were red, his speech was slurred, and that there was a strong 
odor of alcohol emanating from his body. R.63. 
Based on these observations, Trooper Plank asked the defendant to perform 
certain field sobriety tests. R. 63. Trooper Plank administered the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus, the nine-step walk and turn, and the one-leg stand. R.63. The 
defendant exhibited indications of intoxication on each test. R.63-64. Trooper 
Plank proceeded to arrest the defendant and requested that the defendant submit to 
a breath test. R.65. Trooper Plank made this request at approximately 1:37 a.m. 
and the defendant agreed to be tested. R.65. 
Trooper Plank decided to transport the defendant to the Sorensen Center to 
administer the breath test. R.65. Trooper Plank estimated that the Sorenson 
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Center, located at 900 West and approximately 1300 West, was twenty-three or 
twenty-four blocks away from the site of the arrest. R 6^ in "!nnk 
liiiiidi'iiffcd thr ii!Hrn<biii [iini plan nil him in ihr 1'ionl MM! IKY a use his vehicle was 
not equipped with a cage. R.70. While traveling to the center, the defendant 
indicated that he felt the need to vomit R 65-66. Trooper Plank pulled over and 
the defendant vomited outside of tl :te \ ehicle R 65-66 A ftei 1:1 le defei idai it 
i eti irned to vehicle, I rooper Plank checked the defendant's mouth to ensure that it 
was clear. R.70. After checking, Trooper Plank began the fifteen-minute 
observation period <i - . i -.. n the car with the defendai 
!, I pon 11; ai" i P! a n Is .'on 1 11 i tcA the observation period 
while performing the necessary paperwork. R.72. During this time, the defendant 
sat at the end of Trooper Plank's desk facing the officer. R 72 \ t 1:58 a.iii , the 
I i i loxi l \ci >(>()() maUiim1 bcj'aii to inn diiloiiihuti't internal i alibialioir R 202 \ t 
2:00 a.m., the defendant blew into the intoxilyzer. R.202. Ihe test result indicated 
a 175 breath alcohol level. R.202. 
Defendant was charged with driving or 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2). 
R.l . On November 1, 2000, the defendant submitted a motion to suppress 
evidence claiming that he had been illegally seized ai id that the bi eath test i e si lit 
was imreliable )ecember 4, 2000, the trial court denied the 
defendant's motion without a hearing. R.29. The defendant asked the trial court to 
reconsider the motion. R.30. I lie trial court granted this request, R 4(J" I lit 
March 12, 2001, Judge Walter Ellett heard arguments from the defendant asserting 
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the trooper 
did not satisfy the fifteen-minute observation period requirement before 
administering the breath test. R.60-78. Judge Ellett denied the defendant's 
motion, finding that Trooper Plank had articulated facts sufficient to support his 
reasonable suspicion that a crime either had been or was about to be committed, 
and that the Trooper had observed the defendant for fifteen minutes prior to 
administering the breath test. R. 107. 
A jury trial was held on April 24, 2002 in front of Judge Pat B. Brian. 
When the defendant finished his case, instructions were given to the jury. Trial 
Tr. 69. Defense counsel objected on the record to jury instruction number eight 
concerning actual physical control. Trial Tr. 81-82. Judge Brian noted and 
overruled the defendant's objection. Trial Tr. 81-82. The jury subsequently 
returned a guilty verdict to the defendant of driving or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. R. 186. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly concluded that Trooper Plank had reasonable 
suspicion to initiate the stop of the defendant based on the fact that Trooper Plank 
viewed a woman running away from the defendant very early in the morning 
across a highway. This suspicion authorized Trooper Plank to investigate any 
possibility of criminal activity. 
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2. The trial court properly admitted the intoxilyzer test results based on its 
findings that Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes before 
administering the test. Furthermore, Trooper Plank was reasonably likely to detect 
any action by the defendant that would compromise the results of the breath test 
when the defendant was positioned near him in the front seat of his vehicle for a 
portion of the fifteen-minute observation period. 
3. The trial court gave an appropriate jury instruction on actual physical 
control. The instruction reflected the relevant, controlling law that this Court has 
announced concerning actual physical control of a vehicle under the driving under 
the influence statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TROOPER PLANK'S STOP OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED ON 
HIS OBSERVATION OF THE DEFENDANT CHASING A 
WOMAN ACROSS A STREET 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that 
Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion to stop and seize him. Br. Aplt. 9 
Specifically, defendant argues that at the moment Trooper Plank actually 
approached, the woman was not in the vicinity, therefore Trooper Plank did 
not have a legal basis to proceed with the stop because any concern for the 
woman's safety had dissipated. Br. Aplt. 12. 
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A. The trial court properly concluded that Trooper Plank 
legally stopped the defendant. 
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress all evidence stemming from 
Trooper Plank's seizure of him. R. 15. After hearing testimony from Trooper 
Plank, the trial court found that the trooper had sufficiently articulated facts that 
supported his suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. R. 
77. The Utah Code provides that a police officer may stop an individual when the 
officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal 
conduct.1 Under this statute, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a "brief 
investigatory stop of an individual by police officers is permissible when the 
officers 'have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual 
is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 
1986) (quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)). 
This Court has stated that suspects need not be engaged in criminal activity 
at the time of the stop to make a seizure lawful: "[T]he conduct observed and/or 
information relied upon need not be illegal or describe illegal activity in order to 
give a law enforcement officer reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long 
as the officer can articulate facts which form the basis for his or her suspicion." 
State v. Nyugen, 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
1
 U.C.A. § 11-1 AS provides "A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the 
act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
8 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App.1990)). There is no "bright line 
delineating what is or is not reasonable." State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506, 508 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). Finally, to determine whether a stop is reasonable, the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered: "Whether there are objective facts to justify 
such a stop depends on the 'totality of the circumstances."' State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
In this case, Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant 
based on the totality of the circumstances. This Court should consider the 
following facts: a woman was being chased by a man (R.62); at approximately 1 
a.m. (R.61); the woman ran across a public street in an apparent attempt to escape 
from the defendant (R.62); and, it appeared that the two were in some type of 
altercation because the trooper heard yelling (R.62). Based on these objective 
facts, it is reasonable to suspect that a host of different crimes, such as assault or 
robbery, could have been or were about to be committed. 
The fact that the defendant's activity was not criminal on its face does not 
render Trooper Plank's stop unlawful. The law only requires that Trooper Plank 
identify the facts that gave rise to the suspicion. State v. Nyugen, 878 P.2d 1183, 
1186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, Trooper Plank indicated at the pretrial 
hearing that chasing and yelling lead him to believe that some type of criminal 
offense had or was about to occur. R.62. After hearing these facts, the trial court 
9 
concluded that "the fact that [Trooper Plank] saw what he saw and has articulated 
it sufficient for me to believe that he thought that a crime had either been 
committed or was about to commit, gives him a basis to turn around, stop and 
inquire." R.77. 
Defendant has argued that any concern for the woman's safety was 
dissipated when the trooper approached because the woman was no longer in the 
vicinity. Under this standard, an officer's reasonable suspicion would abruptly 
vanish when criminal activity is paused or interrupted. The correct legal standard, 
as contained in the Utah Code cited above, states that once an officer has observed 
activity reasonably giving rise to a suspicion of criminal behavior, the officer may 
stop and briefly detain an individual. There is no requirement that the activity 
continue up to the very moment that the officer approaches, or that the officer turn 
away if the activity halts. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2002). 
In summary, Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion that some type of 
criminal activity had or was about to occur. A woman running across a street 
away from a man, can indicate a number of different crimes, including assault, 
sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, or a domestic violence situation. Trooper 
Plank was able to articulate the facts supporting his suspicion to the satisfaction of 
the trial court, and the decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress should be 
affirmed. 
10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
INTOXILYZER TEST RESULTS 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the intoxilyzer test results. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant contends that 
it is questionable whether Trooper Plank began the observation period 
fifteen minutes prior to administering the breath test. Br. Aplt. 20. 
Defendant also argues that even if there was a fifteen minute period, the 
trooper's observation during that time period was insufficient to render the 
test result reliable. Br. Aplt. 20. 
A. The trial court properly admitted the test results upon finding that 
Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes. 
Defendant moved the trial court to exclude the intoxilyzer results as 
unreliable because the defendant vomited prior to taking the test. (R. 15). 
Defendant asserted that Trooper Plank did not observe him for fifteen minutes 
after he vomited. (R. 15-16). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(l)(2002)2, the Department of 
Public Safety has established that intoxilyzer results are admissible if the officer 
observes the test subject for fifteen minutes prior to administering the test to 
ensure that no substance is in the person's mouth. The Drinking Driver, Basic 
Intoxilyzer Manual 118 (Utah Highway Patrol 1998); also see Salt Lake City v. 
2
 U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3(1) provides "The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training." 
11 
Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 
846, 355 P.2d 806, 811 (I960)). If this standard is met, "there is a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(3)(2002). 
In this case, the trial court did not clearly err by admitting into evidence the 
intoxilyzer results because the fifteen-minute observation requirement was met. 
Trooper Plank testified that he began the observation period at 1:45 a.m. and that 
the defendant took the test at 2:00 a.m. R. 70-71. Based on this testimony, Judge 
Ellett found that Trooper Plank "did observe this defendant for a period of 15 
minutes prior to the test being given." R.77. After making this finding, the trial 
court correctly ruled that the test result was admissible: when the standards 
promulgated by the Department of Public Safely are met, there is a presumption 
that the test result is valid. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(2002). 
Defendant argues that Trooper Plank did not observe him for fifteen 
minutes, and contends that his testing began at 1:58 a.m. Defendant points to the 
intoxilyzer result and states that the initial testing began at 1:58 a.m.. Br. Aplt. 19. 
The testing that began at 1:58, however, was of the machine itself, not the 
defendant. From 1:58 until 2:00, the intoxilyzer went through internal calibrations 
that automatically begin at the start of any test. R. 202. The defendant did not 
actually put a breath sample into the intoxilyzer until 2:00 a.m.. R. 202. 
Defendant asserts that it is questionable whether the observation period 
truly began at 1:45 a.m.. Br. Aplt. 20. The time at which the observation period 
12 
began, however, is a factual determination that was decided at the pretrial hearing. 
At that hearing, the State elicited testimony from Trooper Plank that he began the 
observation period at 1:45 a.m. At that time, defense counsel was given full 
opportunity to cross-examine Trooper Plank and discredit how he determined the 
beginning point of the observation period. After hearing the testimony of the 
trooper and arguments from counsel, Judge Ellett ruled "[i]ts my finding that 
[Trooper Plank] did observe this defendant for a period of 15 minutes prior to the 
test being given." While an appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal 
accuracy and uniformity, the appellate court should defer to the trial court on 
factual matters. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317 ^ 10, 57 P.3d 1111, 
1113 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). This Court has noted that "[i]t is inappropriate for an 
appellate court to disregard the trial court's findings of fact and to assume the role 
of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fac t . . . . The court of 
appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find 
new facts or reweigh the evidence." Ibid. This Court should decline defendant's 
request to disturb the trial court's findings. 
B. Trooper Plank observed the defendant in a manner that was 
reasonably likely to detect any actions that would have compromised 
the test results. 
Defendant also argues that Trooper Plank's surveillance during the 
observation period was insufficient. Br. Aplt. 20. Defendant cites to a case 
decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals for the proposition that "the level of 
surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the 
13 
purpose of the [observation] requirement." State v. Carson, 988 P.2d 225, 227 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999). The Carson court explained that an officer must watch the 
suspect in "a mode of observation that would be likely to detect belching, 
regurgitation into the mouth, or the like." Ibid, The defendant's assertion is 
unpersuasive because Utah courts have not adopted the standard defendant 
proposes. The authoritative law for this issue in Utah is the standard established 
by the Utah Department of Public Safety. This standard requires a fifteen-minute 
observation period and makes no indication that it is improper for an officer to 
begin an observation period while in his cruiser. Based on this standard, Trooper 
Plank's observations of the defendant in his cruiser are acceptable to begin the 
fifteen-minute observation period. 
Furthermore, even if the Carson standard is applicable, Trooper Plank was 
reasonably likely to be able to sufficiently observe the defendant because the 
defendant was in the front seat of his cruiser. In deciding the proper level of 
surveillance, it should be noted that Idaho and a number of other jurisdictions do 
not require an officer to "stare fixedly" at a suspect before testing. State v. 
Remsburg, 882 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). As a Connecticut court 
stated: 
In light of the regulation's purpose, we do not interpret [it] to require that 
an officer fix his unswerving gaze upon a subject during each fifteen 
minute interval prior to administration of a breath test. Such an 
interpretation would not only be practically impossible to perform but 
would allow a subject to thwart compliance with the regulation simply by 
turning his head away from the observing officer. 
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State v. Smith, 547 A.2d 69, 73 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); also see Gilbreath v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 713 P.2d 218 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Goode v. State, 
303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.2d 430 (1990); Tipton v. Com., 770 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1989); State v. Taylor, 781 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Simpson v. 
State, 707 P.2d 43 (Okl. Ct. App. 1985); State v. St. Jean, 554 A.2d 206 (R.I. 
1989). 
In Carson, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated "[although the observation 
requirement does not mandate that an officer 'stare fixedly' at a test subject for the 
full fifteen-minute period, the level of surveillance must be such as could 
reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson, 
988 P.2d at 227 (citation omitted). In that case, part of the fifteen-minute 
observation period occurred while Carson was in the back seat of the officer's 
cruiser. Because the officer's visual and aural senses were compromised, the court 
found that the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirements for 
admittance of the breath test. Ibid. 
The Carson court indicates that the following facts influenced its 
determination that the officer could not have maintained a proper level of 
surveillance. The officer's attention was devoted to driving. Ibid. The officer 
placed Carson in the rear seat of his cruiser while transporting him to a testing 
center. Ibid. The officer "observed Carson only intermittently through glances at 
the rearview mirror." Ibid. The officer's ability "to use hearing as a substitute for 
visual observation was impeded by noise from the automobile engine, tires on the 
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road surface, rain and windshield wipers." Ibid, Finally, the officer's "powers of 
aural observation were compromised by a hearing impairment." Ibid. Based on 
these facts, the court determined that the officer could not have reasonably been 
likely to detect belching, regurgitation, etc.. Ibid. 
The case before this Court is distinguishable from Carson on nearly all of 
these facts. Most importantly, Trooper Plank was not limited to intermittent 
glances through the rearview mirror to observe the defendant. Rather, in this case, 
the defendant was in the front seat of the cruiser with Trooper Plank. Trooper 
Plank testified that the defendant was "right next" to him in the car. Trial Tr p.39. 
In this position, Trooper Plank had constant peripheral observation of the 
defendant even while watching the road. Furthermore, after the defendant 
vomited the first time, Trooper Plank testified, "I was actually more attentive than 
normally because I'm really worried about my upholstery in my car, so I am more 
attentive at looking at him than—than the road probably." Trial Tr p.40. From this 
position, it was reasonably likely that Trooper Plank would have noticed any 
vomiting, belching, or regurgitation by the defendant. In fact, because of his 
proximity to the defendant, it is perhaps even more likely that Trooper Plank could 
have detected actions in the car than he would have in the police station. 
Furthermore, this case is also distinguishable from Carson because Trooper 
Plank did not have to substitute aural for visual observations as the defendant was 
right next to him. In fact, Trooper Plank's aural sense complimented his visual 
observations. In this case, there is no evidence that Trooper Plank is hearing 
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impaired. There is no evidence that it was raining on the evening in question, 
eliminating any possibility of noise from the rain or the windshield wipers. Also, 
Trooper Plank testified that dispatch was not overly distracting because "it's 2:00 
a.m., so it's pretty dead." Trial Tr. p.39. Therefore, besides seeing the defendant 
belch, regurgitate, etc., Trooper Plank also would have heard any of these actions. 
In summary, Trooper Plank was reasonably likely to detect any action by 
the defendant that would have compromised the test result. Therefore, the 
trooper's level of surveillance was sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the 
observation requirement. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT GAVE A PROPER JURY INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
as to the appropriate elements and proof required to demonstrate actual physical 
control. Br. Aplt. 21. (capitalization and boldface omitted). Defendant claims 
that the Utah Supreme Court has defined actual physical control to include an 
element of intent to drive or operate the vehicle. Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant 
also argues that this Court has developed an incorrect guideline on actual 
physical control by erroneously looking to Utah Supreme Court cases 
decided in the context of driver's license revocation hearings. Br. Aplt. 
32-33. 
A. Instruction number eight was proper because it accurately states the 
law regarding actual physical control. 
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At trial, counsel for the defense objected to jury instruction number eight. 
(Trial Tr. 81.). Instruction number eight reads as follows: 
A person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a 
vehicle in order to have actual physical control, the person only 
needs to have the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle. R. 177. 
The jury was also instructed in a separate instruction, instruction number five, that 
the subjective intent of the defendant not to drive does not preclude a finding of 
actual physical control. R. 173. Defense counsel did not object to this 
instruction. (Trial Tr. 81-82). The propriety of instruction number five, therefore, 
should not be reviewed by this Court. "[A] contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal." State v. 
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989)(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 551 (Utah 1987)). The objection must give the trial court notice of the "very 
error" complained of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)(quoting Beehive Medical Elec, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 
P.2d 859, 860 (Utah (1983)). 
The trial court's decision to give instruction number eight should 
be reviewed for correctness. "Determining the propriety of the instructions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial 
court's instructions under a correction of error standard." State v. Gonzales, 2002 
UT App 25617, 56 P.3d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Ames v. Maas, 
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846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "Generally, when an instruction 
correctly states the law and does not unfairly prejudice the defendant, there is no 
error." Ibid. \ 16, at 973. 
It was proper for the trial court to give instruction number eight to the jury 
because the language in this instruction was taken directly from controlling 
caselaw. In State v. Barnhart, this Court reviewed decisions of the Utah Supreme 
and appellate courts dealing with actual physical control, and recognized several 
established legal guidelines. 850 P.2d 473, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). That "a 
person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to 
have an apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual 
physical control," is one such guideline set forth in Barnhart. Ibid, (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant, however, asserts that this Court has developed incorrect 
guidelines concerning actual physical control by erroneously relying on cases 
stemming from license revocation proceedings to the exclusion of the definition 
provided in State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971)3. Based on this Court's 
alleged mistake, defendant states that "the substantial burden of persuasion for 
overturning prior precedent has been met in this case given that the standards 
The Bugger court provided the following definition for actual physical control: The 
word 'actual' has been defined as meaning 'existing in act or reality;***in action or 
existence at the time being; present;***'The word 'physical' is defined as 'bodily,' and 
'control' is defined as 'to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; 
regulate; hence, to hold from actions; to curb.' The term in 'actual physical control' in its 
ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, 
domination or regulation.' Ibid, at p.443. 
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applied by the court of appeals in D.U.I, cases do not comport with the 
requirements set forth in Bugger, a Utah Supreme Court decision." Br. Aplt. p.33-
34 fn.4. Defendant contends that Bugger stands for the proposition that a person 
must have some level of intent to drive or operate the vehicle to be in actual 
physical control. 
Defendant, however, ignores the fact that the driving under the influence 
statute does not, on its face, include intent to drive as a component of actual 
physical control. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) prohibits any individual who is 
under the influence of alcohol from operating or being in actual physical control of 
a vehicle. The statute states "[a] person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . . . " This statute (hereinafter 
the D.U.I. statute) can be violated either by an intoxicated person driving a 
vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle. The statute does not 
provide a mens rea for either action, and clearly does not state that actual physical 
control must be accompanied by a specific intent to drive. Defendant is, 
essentially, asking this Court to add an element to the plain language of the D.U.I, 
statute. The Utah Supreme Court has "rejected similar attempts to engraft a 
judicially created intent requirement upon the plain language of a criminal 
statute." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993)(finding intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud not required under securities fraud statute). 
Defendant himself does not attempt to rely on the D.U.I, statute for his 
contention that actual physical control includes an "intent to drive" requirement. 
20 
Rather, defendant argues that the Utah Supreme Court's definition of actual 
physical control in State v. Bugger requires some level of intent to drive or operate 
the vehicle. Br. Aplt. p. 23. The Bugger decision itself, however, does not state 
that "intent to drive" is required under actual physical control. Defendant claims 
that this requirement can be derived from the definition of control given by the 
Supreme Court because this definition requires affirmative action. Br. Aplt. p. 23. 
The Bugger definition of actual physical control includes "'existing' or 'present 
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.'" Bugger, 483 P.2d 
at 405. None of these terms can fairly be said to inherently require an intent to 
drive a vehicle. 
Finally, the cases that have been issued since Bugger have gone on to 
clearly state that intent to drive is not a component of actual physical control. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
[W]e find it unnecessary for the department to show actual intent under the 
control provisions of the implied consent statute. Just as an intent to drive 
is inferred from one's actual driving, so also may an intent to control a 
vehicle be inferred from the performance of those acts which we have held 
to constitute actual physical control. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1982). This Court applied the 
Garcia standard in criminal cases, finding "a person need not actually move, or 
attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent ability to start and 
move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control" under the D.U.I, statute. 
State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 654-55 (Utah 1982)). 
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The Utah Supreme Court stated that the relevant question for determining 
actual physical control is not whether the person had intent to drive, but rather 
whether they had the ability to drive: "as long as a person is physically able to 
assert dominion by starting the car and driving away, he has substantially as much 
control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving it." Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780-781 (Utah 1986) (quoting Adams v. State, 697 
P.2d 622, 625 (Wyo. 1985)). Furthermore, this Court has not listed intent as a 
relevant factor for determining if an individual is in actual physical control: 
(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the 
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was 
running; (4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the 
vehicle; (5) whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether 
defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's apparent 
ability to start and move the vehicle; (8) how the car got to the where it was 
found; and (9) whether defendant drove it there. 
Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
These cases represent the controlling law in Utah for determining if a 
person is in actual physical control of a vehicle. The trial court gave jury 
instructions that were consistent with these cases, and, therefore, issued the correct 
instructions.4 
Defendant essentially asserts that the cases decided by this Court 
concerning actual physical control, the same cases relied upon for the challenged 
4
 Instruction five provides, "The subjective intent of the defendant not to operate a 
vehicle does not prevent you from finding that the defendant was in actual physical 
control." Instruction eight states, "A person need not actually move, or attempt to move, 
a vehicle in order to have actual physical control, the person only needs to have the 
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle." 
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jury instruction, are wrong. Defendant contends that this Court was incorrect in 
looking to cases decided in the context of license revocation hearings because the 
burden of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that required in civil 
cases. Defendant, however, has not cited any authority for the proposition that a 
definition developed in the context of civil hearings cannot be used or relied on in 
a criminal proceeding. Defendant also fails to provide any authority for the 
proposition that the applicable burden of proof requires a change in the elements 
of an offense. The burden of proof goes to the fact-finder's level of certainty, 
while the elements define the offense. The substantive content of the instruction 
does not need to be altered so long as the jury is instructed that they must find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant urges this Court to grant a new trial because of the trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury that they were required to find that the defendant 
intended to drive while in actual physical control of a vehicle. Defendant, 
however, objected to only one instruction, and did not proffer an instruction 
concerning intent. Furthermore, defendant's contention that actual physical 
control includes an "intent to drive" component is not supported by the D.U.I, 
statute or the caselaw defining actual physical control. The trial court acted 
properly by giving an instruction in accordance with the current law, and should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that Trooper Plank had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant and ask him questions after hearing the trooper's 
testimony that he observed the defendant chase a woman across a street an hour 
after midnight. 
The trial court properly admitted the breath test result because the court 
found that the fifteen minute observation period requirement had been satisfied. 
Moreover, while seated next to the hand-cuffed defendant, Trooper Plank's level 
of surveillance was such that he would have been reasonably likely to detect any 
action on the part of the defendant that would have compromised the test results. 
Finally, the contested jury instruction concerning actual physical control 
reflected the controlling case law on this subject as announced by this Court. The 
trial court was therefore correct in giving this instruction to the jury. 
Based on the arguments above, the State asks this Court to affirm the 
defendant's conviction and deny his request for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^  (lay of February, 2003. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney 
Alicia H. Cook 
Deputy District Attorney 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-6-44(2) Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with a specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within 
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-6-44.3 Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records 
of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in 
Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and 
the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
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Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-7-15 Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect -
Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 




TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
I think as we look at circumstances today we put on officers is a [sic] 
terrible burden, particularly where it may require them to investigate 
domestic violence. And I think anytime they see anything that could 
indicate a domestic violence circumstance coming on, I think we obligate 
them to check and see. If we don't, they subject themselves to some kind 
of (inaudible) for not doing something. The fact that he saw what he saw 
and has articulated it sufficient for me to believe that he thought that a 
crime had either been committed or was about to commit, gives him a basis 
to turn around, stop and inquire. So I think that test has been met. I think 
he had a right to do that. 
The question now comes to the circumstances on the DUI. I think 
once he makes the stop, once he makes the (inaudible) aspect of it, and 
determines that there is an odor of alcohol and the defendant has failed to 
do the tests that are normally given, then of course that leads him to believe 
that additional tests, including breath tests, should be given. Its [sic] my 
finding that he did observe this defendant for a period of 15 minutes prior 
to the test being given. I don't think that belching or burping is going to be 
an expiration that was anticipated by State v. Baker. I think that's a 
situation where it brings something into the mouth. I don't think that 
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(inaudible) odor from the stomach would constitute something that could 




Portion of Trial Transcript Containing Objection to Instruction 
Number Eight. 
The Court: The record will reflect the court's in session out of the presence 
of the jury. You may be seated. The Court has permitted counsel to make a 
record on one jury instruction after the fact, noting that the Court ruled the 
instruction was appropriate, and you may make whatever record you wish. 
Ms. Romero: Thank you, Judge. My objection was to instruction number 8. 
It reads as follows: 
"A person need not actually move or attempt to move a vehicle in 
order to have actual physical control. The person only needs to have the 
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle." 
I objected to that instruction because it comes directly from a case 
involving an administrative hearing with respect to the suspension of an 
individual's driver's license, clearly a much lower standard that [sic] we 
deal with in the criminal system. And my objection to that essentially was 
that we've seen throughout the caselaw involving actual physical control 
the courts get confused and cite you civil cases for standards applicable in 
criminal cases. 
So I have a generalized objection to that instruction because it does 
come from a driver's license revocation proceeding case generally, and I 
also have an objection to the fact that I know it appears subsequently cited 
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in criminal cases, but again they're quoting directly from the civil-
proceeding opinions. So that's my objection. I don't think it's the 
appropriate standard in a criminal case. Thank you. 
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